Advocates of good government in South Carolina have long recognized that the state’s governing structure is outdated, inefficient and not transparent. At the root of the problem is a concentration of legislative power that permits the General Assembly to inordinately influence executive and judicial branch functions—in particular, through the Legislature’s power over hundreds of executive and judicial appointments. In addition, the Legislature’s long session facilitates control by the legislative leadership over executive branch duties while a lack of recorded votes frustrates accountability and transparency.
As it is the center of power in the state, reform must begin with the South Carolina General Assembly. But the Legislature itself is essentially run by four individuals: the Speaker of the House, the President Pro Tempore of the Senate, the Chairman of the House Ways & Means Committee, and the Chairman of the Senate Finance Committee. The scope of their power is wide-ranging:
The Speaker of the House and the Senate President Pro Tempore, combined, make more than 100 appointments to executive branch boards and commissions—15 percent as many as the governor himself.
The Legislature makes more than 420 appointments to 165 boards and commissions. This is more than half as many as the governor makes.
The Speaker of the House appoints all committee members, who in turn, select the chair of each committee. This includes the chair of the House Ways & Means Committee.
The chair of the House Ways & Means Committee and the chair of the Senate Finance Committee exercise enormous power over state government by virtue of their positions on the Budget & Control Board (BCB).
The BCB itself controls billions in state spending and holds power over many functions that in other states belong to an executive-level Department of Administration.
Unlike the other three members of the BCB, the legislative members of the board are not elected to statewide office. In fact, the Senate Finance chair is in no way accountable to voters statewide and holds his position based solely on seniority.
South Carolina has the longest legislative session in the Southeast and the longest in the country, among part-time legislatures. The session is five-months long, meeting three days a week. Such a lengthy session is not only unnecessary, it bars most citizens from serving in the Legislature. In turn, South Carolina’s long session fosters a political culture that encourages special-interest legislation and high spending.
Measured in terms of months, South Carolina has the longest session in the Southeast (tied for 1st with Tennessee).
South Carolina also has the 6th longest session in the country, in term of months (tied with 7 other states).
Academic studies have found that professional, full-time legislatures pass more bills catering to special interests and spend more than part-time legislatures. In other words, professional legislatures are more prone to pressure from lobbyists and this translates into higher spending.
South Carolina’s long legislative session means more time for lobbyists—356 representing 488 companies, including 86 taxpayer-funded lobbyists —to influence lawmakers. There are two registered lobbyists for every legislator in South Carolina.
South Carolina’s long session produces few results, both in terms of sound public policy, or even the number of bills introduced and passed. The South Carolina Legislature passed about 1 bill a year/per legislator during the 2009 and 2010 sessions. Legislators introduced about 7 bills annually during the same period.
The first step toward holding the legislative leadership accountable for their actions is to hold legislators accountable for their votes. Yet, the Senate and House combined voted on the record less than 25 percent of the time in both 2009 and 2010. By contrast, 45 other states require a recorded vote on every bill that becomes law.
In a representative democracy citizens have a basic right to know how their legislators are voting. As such, roll call voting requirements should be protected by statute, if not constitutional law.
Legislation requiring recorded votes cannot be reduced to procedural questions regarding General Assembly rules, but are a fundamental right. As such, a law requiring roll call voting for every bill, resolution and amendment would withstand constitutional challenge.
The General Assembly recorded only 25 percent of its votes in 2010, the same as in 2009. The percentage of recorded votes in the House declined from 31 percent in 2009 to 27 percent in 2010. In the Senate, the percentage increased from 16 percent in 2009 to 22 percent in 2010.
Significant legislation routinely passes on anonymous voice votes. This includes measures seeking to create new agencies; grant targeted tax exemptions and corporate subsidies; and impose new business regulations and fees.
Government in South Carolina is not working.
The state consistently ranks at the bottom in terms of jobs, income, education and health. It’s time for fundamental change. Change that begins by taking back power from the Legislature, cutting spending and shortening session, and providing for real transparency and accountability. South Carolina’s future depends on it.
Nothing in the foregoing should be construed as an attempt to aid or hinder passage of any legislation.
Written by Dr. Jameson Taylor, with Jamie Cordova and Simon Wong
Thursday, 26 August 2010 08:30
Policy Report: Shorten South Carolina’s Legislative Session
Executive Summary
Any way you measure it, South Carolina has one of the longest legislative sessions in the country. Such a lengthy session is not only unnecessary, it bars most citizens from serving in the Legislature. In turn, South Carolina’s long session fosters a political culture that encourages special-interest legislation and high spending.
South Carolina’s legislative session is five-months long, meeting three days a week. This translates into 21 weeks a year. By comparison, the national median is 4 months, or 16 weeks.
Measured in terms of months, South Carolina has the longest session in the Southeast (tied for 1st with Tennessee) and the 6th longest (tied with 7 other states) in the country.
Academic studies have found that professional, full-time legislatures pass more bills catering to special interests and spend more than part-time legislatures. In other words, professional legislatures are more prone to pressure from lobbyists and this translates into higher spending.
South Carolina’s long legislative session means more time for lobbyists—356 representing 488 companies, including 86 taxpayer-funded lobbyists —to influence lawmakers. There are two registered lobbyists for every legislator in South Carolina.
South Carolina’s long session produces few results, both in terms of sound public policy, or even the number of bills introduced and passed. The South Carolina Legislature passed about 1 bill a year/per legislator during the 2009 and 2010 sessions. Legislators introduced about 7 bills annually during the same period.
The following reforms would place South Carolina’s session on par with other states:
Require session to end by 5 p.m. on the second Friday in April (roughly 90 calendar days)
Cap session at no more than 45 legislative days within the above calendar limit
Cap legislative budget spending increases at the rate of inflation
In the end, shortening session is about changing the culture of South Carolina’s state government. Fewer days in Columbia means less face time with lobbyists and more time spent at home with constituents. Fewer days in Columbia means less money for legislative staff and more money for ordinary taxpayers. Most important, less time in Columbia means less government—more prosperity and more freedom.
One of the pillars of republican government is the principle of “separation of powers.” This term refers to the idea that governmental power should be divided into three branches: legislative, executive and judiciary. Here in South Carolina, however, the state constitution concentrates a great deal of power in the Legislature, at the expense of both the executive and judicial branches, as well as ordinary taxpayers. Breaking this power monopoly is essential if South Carolinians are going to take back their state from the politicians and lobbyists that control our government and economy.
One of the Longest Sessions in the Country
How Long Is South Carolina’s Legislative Session? 5 months 21 weeks 143 calendar days 63 legislative days
Any way you measure it, South Carolina has one of the longest legislative sessions in the country. Legislators meet five months each and every year. In terms of months, that means South Carolina has the longest session in the Southeast (tied for 1st with Tennessee) and the 6th longest in the country (tied with 7 other states).
In terms of weeks, South Carolina’s session can be pegged at 21 weeks. That gives us the 2nd longest session in the Southeast and the 14th longest in the country. Excluding the nation’s 10 full-time, professional legislatures, South Carolina has the longest session in the country as measured by months and the 7th longest session in terms of weeks. By comparison, the median length of session for state legislatures is 16 weeks.[1] Thus, South Carolina’s session is more than a month longer than in most states.
According to article III, § 9 of the state constitution, the annual session of the General Assembly shall convene “on the second Tuesday of January of each year.” But the constitution does not stipulate a limit to the length of session. Rather, state law (§ 2-1-180) requires that session end by 5 p.m. on the first Thursday in June, unless legislators agree by a two-thirds vote to extend it. For the 118th General Assembly (2009 and 2010) this meant that the Legislature met for 143 calendar days each year.
In 2010, Virginia’s General Assembly only stayed in session 46 days.
In 2010, Mississippi’s General Assembly only stayed in session 45 days.
In 2010, Arkansas’ General Assembly only stayed in session 45 days.
Professional Legislatures and Career Politicians
Legislatures are usually classified as being either full-time, professional bodies, or part-time, citizen bodies. According to the National Conference of State Legislatures (NCSL), four states have fully “professional” legislatures while another six have mostly professional bodies. Six states have fully “citizen” legislatures while eleven more have mostly citizen legislatures. The remaining states, including South Carolina, have “hybrid” legislatures—meaning their legislative bodies display a mix of professional and citizen characteristics.
In practice, the S.C. Legislature convenes five months a year: from January to the beginning of June. Technically, legislators meet three days a week—Tuesday to Thursday—during this time. For the 118th General Assembly Session, they met for an average of 59 working days each year. (These figures are lower than normal because of several “furloughs” taken by the House and Senate.)
The actual number of legislative days, however, is less important than the fact that session takes up nearly half a year. In practice, this means South Carolina does have a largely professional legislature. Most South Carolinians cannot work only Mondays and Fridays (not to mention travel time) for five months out of the year. At the minimum, then, being a state legislator requires a five-month, full-time commitment. But, in essence, this five-month commitment is not much different than an entire year. Again, most people cannot take five months off from work or other commitments each year. And this does not even take into account the time needed to campaign for office and run in primary and general elections. Thus South Carolina’s five-month-long session bars most ordinary citizens from being lawmakers.
It is to be expected that citizens will serve in public office for a short time only and “called for the most part from pursuits of a private nature, continued in appointment for a short time, and led by no permanent motive to devote the intervals of public occupation to a study of the laws.”
The difference between a professional legislature and a citizen legislature can be made more vividly illustrated by contrasting the following two types or models: that of the “career politician” and the “citizen legislator.”
Government entities, including state agencies, public universities and local governments, spend millions each year on taxpayer-funded lobbying. For 2010, 68 government entities employed 86 taxpayer-funded lobbyists.
For the career politician, re-election is more important than making good laws or serving constituents. These latter considerations may have value to the career politician, but they are subordinate to remaining in office. This is especially true because the career politician has no other livelihood or marketable skills. In turn, the career politician is more readily influenced by lobbyists and special interests because these interests are the primary sources of campaign contributions.
The citizen legislator, on the other hand, holds public office as a form of public service. George Washington, who was reluctant to serve a second-term as the first U.S. president and refused a third term, is the model citizen statesman. Like Washington, the citizen legislator may devote his life to the service of his country or state, but not out of self-interest, much less on behalf of special interests.
Budget Appropriations Per Capita, 2009-2010: Neighboring States
It would be naïve to hold every legislator up to the model of Washington. In reality, most lawmakers have conflicting impulses that reflect both types. As we shall see, though, the political culture created by a long session makes it far easier to be a career politician than a citizen legislator.
High Spending and Influential Lobbyists
Above we correlate a long session with a professional legislature that fosters the rise of career politicians with close ties to lobbyists and special interests. These assumptions are not mere speculation but supported by academic evidence.
Gamm and Kouser (2010) have found that professional legislatures tend to cater more to special interests and pass more bills benefitting targeted groups. In turn, Owings and Borck (2000) have concluded that professional legislatures spend more than citizen legislatures. In other words, professional legislatures are more prone to pressure from lobbyists and this translates into higher spending.
Legislative Appropriations Per Capita, 2009-2010: Neighboring States
As discussed in Unleashing Capitalism, the Policy Council’s blueprint for prosperity in South Carolina, lobbying is a form of unproductive entrepreneurship. This is because lobbying does not produce new resources or products, but is dedicated to taking resources (tax dollars) from taxpayers and giving it to special interests. In 2010, there were 356 registered lobbyists representing 488 companies and organizations. Thus, there were more than two lobbyists for every legislator.
While the unproductive entrepreneurship of lobbyists constitutes a drain on the state’s economy, what’s worse is the “pay-to-play” culture that lobbying fosters. This culture not only facilitates the rise of career politicians, it empowers them. Likewise, it is this culture that has led lawmakers to act as if they are responsible for directing the state’s economy and picking economic winners and losers.
Such an attitude has translated into more than $1.5 billion in economic incentives spending since FY1995. Likewise, state spending continues to increase, hitting an all-time high of $21 billion in 2010, in spite of the ongoing recession.
While a long session provides numerous opportunities for lobbyists to influence legislation, it also helps sustain high salaries for legislative staff. As reported by the online investigative news site The Nerve: “The Senate will spend slightly more than $4 million in $50,000-plus salaries for 56 staffers this fiscal year, while the 124-member House will spend $2.4 million in $50,000-plus salaries for its 35 highest-earning employees. The average top salaries in the Senate and House are $72,439 and $69,760, respectively.” Moreover, the Senate was one of a handful of agencies to receive a budget increase in FY10-2011—with the $3 million increase being used to fund Senate staff salaries.
Finally, it goes without saying that shortening session would save money insofar as a long session drives up per diem reimbursement (South Carolina's is high for a relatively small state in terms of geography) and creates ongoing infrastructure and administrative costs.
A Long Session with Few Results
South Carolina’s long legislative session could be shortened without compromising legislative effectiveness in any way. As indicated above, most states have much shorter sessions. Of course, in these states the Legislature does not attempt to run state government by controlling the executive branch.
The South Carolina Legislature passed about 1 bill a year per legislator during the 2009 and 2010 sessions. Legislators nationwide introduced about 7 bills annually during the same period.
But how do we measure legislative effectiveness? The most obvious answer is in terms of how well South Carolina is doing in terms of basic outcomes like unemployment, per capita income, education and health. As it turns out, we are not doing very well:
Employment: South Carolina is at the bottom, having the 6th highest unemployment rate in the country, as of July 2010.
Income: Again at the bottom, with the 4th lowest per capita income in the country, at $31,799 for 2009.
Education: 4th worst high school completion rate in the country. Lowest SAT scores in the Southeast and 4th lowest in the county.
Health Care: 5th unhealthiest state in 2009, as based on comprehensive data compiled by America’s Health Rankings.
Alternatively, we can also judge legislative effectiveness by internal legislative standards—for instance, in terms of number of bills introduced and passed each session. Even here, South Carolina falls short.
Texas, for instance, has one of the shorter sessions in the country—meeting once every two years for 140 calendar days. Yet, Texas’ 181 legislators introduced 7,419 bills in 2009-2010, compared to 2,454 for South Carolina. Likewise, legislators in Virginia, which has one of the shortest sessions in the Southeast (ranked 10th in terms of weeks), passed 1,541 bills in 2010—more than any other state in the region.
By comparison, the South Carolina Legislature passed about one bill a year/per legislator during the 2009 and 2010 sessions. Legislators introduced about seven bills annually during the same period. This failure to introduce new legislation could indicate that lawmakers simply don’t have many good ideas; and/or that many of them feel stifled by a legislative leadership that exercises tight control over what bills are passed—and passed over.
In any event, the quality of a legislature is measured neither by its length nor the number of bills it passes, but by the quality of life its governance helps foster. Here, again, South Carolina lawmakers are failing their constituents.
Instead of introducing bills that would bring about free market reform in areas as diverse as education and the environment, legislators wasted time on a variety of onerous and impractical ideas in 2010. They include:
Granting special permission for legislators to carry concealed weapons (H 4112)
Likewise, during the 2010 session lawmakers indulged in several lengthy debates on trivial issues, such as whether the marsh tacky should be named the official state heritage work animal.
But if lawmakers are not improving South Carolina’s quality of life, much less debating innovative public policy ideas, why are they in session so long? It would seem South Carolina’s long session is primarily devoted to maintaining the legislative leadership’s control over state government—that is, attempting to run state government.
As detailed in the companion report to this brief, Reform the Legislature, the General Assembly controls all upper-level judicial branch appointments and hundreds of executive branch appointments. By means of the two positions they hold on the Budget & Control Board, the legislative leadership also exercises a great deal of power over the daily operation of state executive agencies. The irony, of course, is that in attempting to maintain control over the executive branch, the Legislature is failing to use its proper authority to actually pass substantial legislation that would bring prosperity to South Carolina.
Shorten Session to 45 Legislative Days
A 45-Day Session for 2011? In practice, requiring session to end by the second Friday in April would work like this:
As required by the constitution, legislators would convene in Columbia on January 11
Legislators would have until April 8 to complete their duties
Legislators meet 4 days a week (Tuesday to Friday)
As a result, session ends on March 25: one day short of the statutory limit of 45 days
While 16 weeks is the national median, many states have much shorter legislative sessions. Here in the Southeast, the average legislature met for 94 days during
the 2009 and 2010 sessions: translating into 47 actual days per year. Capping South Carolina’s legislative session at 45 days should thus give legislators more than enough time to complete their duties.
The following reforms would place South Carolina’s session on par with other states:
Require session to end by 5 p.m. on the second Friday in April (roughly 90 calendar days)
Cap session at no more than 45 legislative days within the above calendar limit
Cap legislative budget spending increases at the rate of inflation
Shortening session is about more than just cutting costs and increasing access for ordinary citizens; it is about changing the culture in South Carolina’s state government. Fewer days in Columbia means less face time with lobbyists and more time spent at home with constituents. Fewer days in Columbia means less money for legislative staff and more money for ordinary taxpayers. Most important, less time in Columbia means less government—more prosperity and more freedom.
Nothing in the foregoing should be construed as an attempt to aid or hinder passage of any legislation.
[1]Length of session is calculated using statutory and constitutional limits for odd and even year sessions. Those states that do not have a statutory or constitutional session limit were asked to identify what their informal cutoff date is for session. Calculations using actual days met for 2009 and 2010 produced similar results and will be released in a forthcoming report. Session months and weeks are defined in the most comprehensive manner possible. For instance, South Carolina’s Legislature meets for 3 legislative days within a 5-day calendar period. These 3 days are counted as one session week. If a legislature met for only 1 day a week that 1 day would also signify a full session week, and so on.
Written by Dr. Jameson Taylor, with Jamie Cordova and Simon Wong
Thursday, 26 August 2010 08:22
Policy Report: Reform the South Carolina Legislature
Executive Summary
South Carolina’s General Assembly has long enjoyed a virtual monopoly of power over the state’s government and economy. The Legislature overshadows the executive branch and controls judicial branch appointments. Likewise, the Legislature directs South Carolina’s economy by means of numerous boards and regulations, as well as by distributing billions of dollars in economic incentives and tax breaks to special interests.
Appointment Power Over Hundreds of Executive and Judicial Branch Positions
The Legislature makes more than 420 appointments to executive branch boards and commissions—more than half as many as the governor makes.
The Speaker of the House and the Senate President Pro Tempore, combined, make more than 120 appointments to executive branch boards and commissions—15 percent as many as the governor himself.
The Legislature also exercises significant influence over the judicial branch through its exclusive control of upper-level judiciary appointments. South Carolina is the only state in the country that gives its legislature such power.
Concentrated Power in the Legislative Leadership
The Legislature itself is essentially run by four individuals: the Speaker of the House, the President Pro Tempore of the Senate, the Chairman of the House Ways & Means Committee, and the Chairman of the Senate Finance Committee.
The Speaker of the House appoints all committee members, who in turn, select the chair of each committee. This includes the chair of the House Ways & Means Committee.
The chair of the House Ways & Means Committee and the chair of the Senate Finance Committee exercise enormous power over state government by virtue of their positions on the Budget & Control Board (BCB).
Unlike the other three members of the BCB, the legislative members of the board are not elected to statewide office. In fact, the Senate Finance chair is in no way accountable to voters statewide and holds his position based solely on seniority.
Control Over the Economy, Education and Other Areas
The Legislature exercises tacit control over the state’s government and economy by means of 250-plus boards and commissions that regulate nearly every activity in the state.
By means of such agencies as the S.C. Research Authority and the Endowed Chairs Program the legislative leadership is seeking to create a top-down, government-driven economy for South Carolina.
The General Assembly likewise exercises a great deal of control over K-12 school policy via the State Board of Education and over the state’s university system by means of its appointment power over higher-ed boards.
Finally, in the name of “job creation,” legislators have allocated more than $1.5 billion in economic incentives to favored business interests.
If one of the primary obstacles to good government in South Carolina is a state constitution that concentrates power in the Legislature, there are several statutory changes that would go a long way toward breaking the Legislature’s control over our state’s government and economy. These include: eliminating the Budget & Control Board; reforming the Senate committee selection and chairman appointment process; and increasing gubernatorial authority over executive branch boards and commissions.
One of the primary obstacles to good government in South Carolina is a state constitution that concentrates power in the Legislature—at the expense of both the executive and judicial branches, as well as ordinary taxpayers. This power structure goes back to colonial times and is rooted in the control exercised by large plantation owners over the state’s government and economy.[1] Today, not much has changed. The Legislature still overshadows the executive branch and controls who serves in the judicial branch. Likewise, the Legislature directs South Carolina’s economy by means of numerous boards and regulations, as well as by distributing billions of dollars in economic incentives and targeted tax wbreaks to special interests.
Legislative Control over the Executive Branch
During the 118th General Assembly, legislators considered creating several new boards aimed at regulating interior designers (S 45); music therapists (H 4624); repo men (S 1073); taxi drivers (H 4469); and talent agencies (H 4235).
South Carolina’s gubernatorial office has long been recognized as the weakest in the country. And although executive authority has increased somewhat over the past few decades, the Legislature is generally able to pursue its own aims, regardless of what the governor, or even the voters, of South Carolina might want. Routine encroachments of legislative power include:
Undermining the governor’s authority to make and remove appointments—for instance, to the Ports Authority; the Aeronautics Commission; the S.C. Research Authority; and the Office of Small and Minority Business Assistance.
Allowing local delegations consisting of as few as one legislator in each chamber to override gubernatorial vetoesof local bills.
Using the Budget & Control Board to control state finances, as well as executive agency operations.
In particular, the Legislature exercises tacit control over the state’s government and economy by means of the 250-plus boards and commissions that regulate nearly every activity in the state. There is an Education Board, Energy Board, Medical Examiners Board, even a Board of Distribution of Dead Human Bodies and a Perpetual Care Cemetery Board.
If both the legislative and executive branches share blame for this vast proliferation of regulatory bodies, the Legislature is ultimately responsible for creating these agencies and their corresponding regulatory and licensing/fee requirements. In particular, the Legislature uses these regulatory boards to control various executive branch functions. We have already mentioned legislative attempts to manipulate appointments to the
Ports Authority, the S.C. Research Authority and other boards. Even more telling is the sheer number of appointments made by the Legislature. Based in our analysis, the Legislature makes more than 420 appointments to executive branch boards and commissions. This is compared to more than 780 by the governor..[2] In other words, the Legislature makes more than half as many appointments as does the governor
Gubernatorial vs. Legislative Appointments to Executive Branch Boards/Commissions
Properly speaking, the legislative branch is responsible for making the law while the executive branch is responsible for enforcing the law. Accordingly, the executive branch is supposed to exercise sole responsibility over routine administrative government activities. At the very least, the governor should have controlling authority over every board and commission, with the power to make a majority of appointments and to remove these appointments at will. In South Carolina, that is not the case. In fact, the Speaker of the House and Senate President Pro Tempore combined make more than 120 executive branch appointments, 15 percent as many as the governor himself.
Legislative Control over the Judicial Branch
The Legislature exercises significant control over the judicial branch through its exclusive control over upper-level judiciary appointments. In fact, South Carolina is the only state in the country that gives its legislature such power. (Virginia’s General Assembly also appoints judges, but the governor may fill unexpired terms.) In practice, this means the judiciary is subordinate to the Legislature.
Theoretically, the Judicial Merit Selection Commission provides guidance and vets potential judges, who are then elected in a joint session of the General Assembly. But the 10-member commission itself is controlled by the legislative leadership, with the Speaker of the House making five appointments, the chairman of the Senate Judiciary Committee making three appointments, and the Senate President Pro Tempore making two appointments. In addition, the Legislature exercises control over the judiciary by means of the state budget (the department’sbudget has been cutby more than $20 million since 2000).
Judicial Appointments Made Exclusively by the General Assembly
Supreme Court Judges: 5 All candidates must be found qualified and nominated by the Judicial Merit Selection Commission. Only nominated candidates—cap of three for each seat—may be voted on by the General Assembly. Election occurs during a joint session.
Court of Appeals Judges: 9 All candidates must be found qualified and nominated by the Judicial Merit Selection Commission. Only nominated candidates—cap of three for each seat—may be voted on by the General Assembly. Election occurs during a joint session. Circuit Court Judges: 51* All candidates must be found qualified and nominated by the Judicial Merit Selection Commission. Only nominated candidates—cap of three for each seat—may be voted on by the General Assembly. Election occurs during a joint session.
Family Court Judges: 59* All candidates must be found qualified and nominated by the Judicial Merit Selection Commission. Only nominated candidates—cap of three for each seat—may be voted on by the General Assembly. Election occurs during a joint session. — — — Administrative Law Court Judges (formally part of the executive branch): 6 All candidates must be found qualified and nominated by the Judicial Merit Selection Commission. Only nominated candidates—cap of three for each seat—may be voted on by the General Assembly. Election occurs during a joint session.
*Includes active/retired judges.
Only Masters-in-Equity and Magistrates are appointed by the governor, with the advice and consent of the General Assembly. Masters have jurisdiction in equity matters, such as foreclosures, referred to them by the Circuit Court. Magistrates likewise are courts of limited civil and criminal jurisdiction, handling matters such as small claims disputes, traffic cases, and issuing warrants.
Legislative Control over State and Local Government
The Budget & Control Board
The BCB undermines gubernatorial authority by delegating executive functions to five individuals, two of whom are not elected to statewide office and are drawn from the legislative leadership.
In addition to the budget, the primary means by which the Legislature controls state government is via the Budget & Control Board (BCB). The BCB is theonly entity of its kindin the country. The board is made up of five elected officials: the governor, the treasurer, the comptroller general, the chairman of the Senate Finance Committee, and the chairman of the House Ways & Means Committee. In addition to making a wide array of state budgetary decisions, the BCB also holds power over many functions that in other states belong to a cabinet-level Department of Administration. These functions include: building and operational maintenance, administration of the State Health Plan and state employee retirement systems, procurement for all agencies, and some human resources duties. Moreover, while its own agency budget is relatively small, the BCB actually controls billions in state funding.
Research by the Policy Council has detailed some of the inefficiencies arising from the BCB’s administrative control over executive agencies.[3] The BCB also exercises significant power over state finances and, when the Legislature is out-of-session, is even empowered to make budget cuts.
The deeper problem is that the BCB undermines gubernatorial authority by delegating executive functions to five individuals, two of which are drawn from the legislative leadership. The result is a fragmentation of executive authority and a resulting loss of accountability. In practice, a coalition comprised of the chairman of the Senate Finance Committee, the chairman of the House Ways & Means Committee, and the state treasurer have consistently used their BCB voting powers to override the governor’s policies—a constitutionally questionable practice.
Reform the Committee Selection Process to Make BCB More Accountable
Of the five members of the Budget & Control Board, two are not directly elected by voters statewide. These are the House Ways & Means Committee chairman and the Senate Finance Committee chairman. Because of the power vested in these two chairmen by virtue of their positions on the BCB, it is worth considering how the House and Senate appoint committee members and choose committee chairs.
The Senate Finance Committee chair is in no way accountable to voters statewide
In the House, the Speaker appoints all committees and each committee elects its own chairman. Indirectly, then, the Speaker has some control over who the chairman of each committee will be.
Accordingly, the Speaker appoints all the members of the Ways & Means Committee. In turn, these appointees elect the chair. In that respect, the Ways & Means chair is at least indirectly answerable to the Speaker. In turn, each House member is responsible for voting for the Speaker, who is elected on the opening day of the organizational session in December.
In the Senate, however, committee appointment and chairmanship is based on seniority. The President Pro Tempore of the Senate does not select the chair of the Finance Committee. Thus, in spite of holding one of the most powerful positions in state government, the Senate Finance chair is in no way accountable to voters statewide.
Along with Arkansas, South Carolina is the only state in the country that bases Senate committee appointments and leadership exclusively on seniority. Changing the committee selection process in the Senate to parallel that of the House would be one reform that could make the BCB more accountable by making the Senate Finance chairman indirectly answerable to the Senate President Pro Tempore.
Education and Other Local Matters
The General Assembly has frequently passed legislation that interferes in local matters. Examples from the 2010 session include: dictating county budget priorities (cf. FY2011 budget, proviso 86.6); intervening in local school board controversies (H 4431 and H 4432); and passing constitutionally questionable laws tailored for individual counties (H 3624).
Especially as it relates to education, the General Assembly exercises a great deal of control over school policy via the State Board of Education. The Board’s 16 members are elected by their respective legislative delegations, with the governor appointing only 1 at-large member. In addition, the legislative leadership plays a significant role in administering education policy via the Education Oversight Committee. The leadership itself appoints 8 of the committee’s 18 members.
Legislative control over South Carolina’s higher educational system is even more complete. According to the Association of Governing Boards of Universities and Colleges, 71 percent of higher education board members nationwide are appointed by governors, typically with legislative confirmation of gubernatorial appointees. In South Carolina this ratio is reversed, with the Legislature appointing 78 percent of higher-ed board trustees at the state’s 10 leading public universities and colleges. As such, South Carolina is one of only three states (along with Minnesota and North Carolina) in which the majority of public higher-educational board trustees are directly appointed by the Legislature.
Legislative Control over the State’s Economy
Although not elected to statewide office, the Chairman of the Senate Finance Committee makes appointments to numerous boards and commissions, including the S.C. Centers of Economic Excellence Review Board, the Retirement System Investment Commission, and the Patriots Point Development Authority
Here it is only possible to provide a sketch of how the Legislature directs South Carolina’s economy. This control is essentially exercised in two ways:
By means of numerous regulatory bodies and licensing requirements
By using public dollars to invest in and subsidize research not supported by the free market; and to award targeted tax breaks and special incentives to private entities
We have already mentioned how the Legislature exercises control over the state’s economy by means of numerous regulatory boards. Unleashing Capitalism, an economic blueprint for restoring free-market principles to South Carolina, explains how this tangle of regulations impacts business:
Many citizens are unaware of the extent to which the federal and state government intervenes in our daily lives. Indeed, government affects almost everything we do, either directly or indirectly. Government taxes almost all monetary transactions, it licenses workers in a wide variety of industries, it regulates technical aspects of many types of consumer products. Government even controls individuals’ behavior on private property. Seldom do voters consider the aggregate monetary and non-monetary costs of government regulation.
All in all, the regulatory burden imposed by the Legislature, and accompanying boards and commissions, costs state businesses billions in lost productivity—with small businesses impacted the most.[4] This is in addition to the federal regulatory burden, w is estimated at between $1.1 trillion and $1.2 trillion nationwide.
The second way in which the Legislature controls the economy is via government driven economic development policies. More precisely, such policies entail using government power (via grants, taxes, fees, regulations, etc.) to provide or promote services that are better left to the free market. By interfering in the economy, government not only wastes tax dollars (by inefficiently allocating resources), it also picks winners and losers in the marketplace. Thus, the objections to a state-run economy are both economic and moral.
Legislative leaders make no secret of their desire to create a top-down economy in South Carolina. Unveiled as part of a “knowledge-economy jobs plan,” the legislative leadership has proposed using a pyramidof 35 state and local entities to essentially plan the state’s economy.
At the top of the pyramid is the South Carolina Research Authority (SCRA). The Authority is a nonprofit entity that manages federal research projects and collaborates with industry and universities. Thus far the Authority has developed several research parks in an attempt to imitate the success of such places as Research Triangle Park in North Carolina and Silicon Valley in California. “Think of the SCRA as the central nervous system of state government’s involvement in the economy,” writes investigative reporting Web site The Nerve. “Created in 1983 under state legislation, the Research Authority extends far-reaching tentacles throughout the business world in South Carolina.”
The Legislative leadership directly appoints two members of the SCRA’s Board. But the Board also includes five university presidents, as well as the chairman of the Commission on Higher Education. As indicated above, the Legislature appoints the majority of trustees on the state’s higher-education boards.
The Legislature also exercises influence over SCRA by means of the state budget. To begin with, the SCRA was created with a taxpayer funded grant of 1,400 undeveloped acres of land and $500,000. More recently, during the 2010 legislative session, lawmakers passed a joint resolution (S 1190) transferring 109 acres ofland to the SCRA. Originally dedicated to a failed farmer’s market project, the land is being paid for via a 2 percent tax increase on prepared food/beverages sold in Richland County. In addition, the 2010 Legislature also tried to give the SCRA the power to conduct economic development and educational improvement activities in counties along I-95, in conjunction with a proposed I-95 Corridor Authority (cf. S 1323). The endeavor failed, but may be resurrected next session.
Another agency being used by the Legislature to direct the state’s economy is the S.C. Centers of Economic Excellence (CoEE). Also known as the Endowed Chairs Program, the CoEE allows USC, Clemson and the Medical University of South Carolina to tap into more than $200 million in taxpayer funds to hire research experts with the goal of spurring economic development.
In the end, both the SCRA and the Endowed Chairs Program are trying to hit upon the “next big thing” that will bring prosperity to South Carolina. The likely result will be wasted tax dollars as state bureaucrats prop up companies the private sector is unwilling to support.
In the name of “job creation,” legislators have allocated more than $1.5 billion in economic incentives to favored business interests.
Unleashing Capitalism extensively documents the state’s attempts to pick winners and losers in the marketplace by means of targeted tax cuts and subsidies. In the name of “job creation,” legislators have allocated more than $1.5 billion in economic incentives to favored business interests. This system of patronage benefits lobbyists and lawmakers at the expense of ordinary businessmen who would be better served by broad based tax cuts and regulatory reform.
Finally, the Legislature exercises influence over numerous economic sectors and activities by means of various agencies over which it has appointment power, such as the Ports Authority Review and Oversight Commission, the Transportation Infrastructure Bank, the Public Service Commission, and the Retirement System Investment Commission.
Conclusion
It is likely that good government in South Carolina will ultimately require constitutional reform. But even as we work toward this reform, there are several statutory changes that would go a long way toward breaking the Legislature’s control over our state’s government and economy. They include:
Eliminating the Budget & Control Board
Limiting session length to 45 legislative days
Requiring a recorded vote on every bill and joint resolution
Reforming the Senate committee selection and chairman appointment process
Reviewing all boards and commissions and increasing gubernatorial appointments to various agencies
Reviewing and sunsetting onerous regulations and licensing requirements (such as the required 1,500 hours of training for cosmetologists)
The consolidation of power in the legislative branch makes reforming state government more difficult in South Carolina than anywhere else. Given the impotence of the executive and judicial branches, the best chance for reform must come from within the Legislature itself. In practice, this means reform-minded legislators being held accountable by the people they represent. In other words, the best chance for reform in South Carolina lies with the people of South Carolina.
Appendix: Legislative Appointments to Select Boards and Commissions
Total Appointments
Senate Pres. Pro Tem
Speaker of House
Chairman of House Ways & Means Cmte.
Chairman of Senate Finance Cmte.
Other General Assembly Members
Governor
Budget and Control Board
5
0
0
1
1
0
1
Economy
Total Appointments
Senate Pres. Pro Tem
Speaker of House
Chairman of House Ways & Means Cmte.
Chairman of Senate Finance Cmte.
Other General Assembly Members
Governor
S.C. Research Authority
24
0
0
1
1
0
1
Ports Authority Review and Oversight Commission
10
2
2
1
1
0
0
Research Centers of Economic Excellence Review Board
14
3
3
1
1
0
3
Transportation Infrastructure Bank
7
2
2
0
0
0
2
Public Service Commission
7
0
0
0
0
7
0
Joint Bond Review Committee
10
0
0
5
5
0
0
Retirement System Investment Commission
6
0
0
1
1
0
1
TOTAL
78
7
7
9
9
7
7
Education
Total Appointments
Senate Pres. Pro Tem
Speaker of House
Chairman of House Ways & Means Cmte.
Chairman of Senate Finance Cmte.
Other General Assembly Members
Governor
State Board of Education
17
0
0
0
0
0
1
Education Oversight Committee
18
3
3
1
1
0
3
Lottery Commission
9
3
3
0
0
0
3
State Commission on Higher Education
14
0
0
0
0
0
14
Public College/University Boards
156
0
0
0
0
122
17
TOTAL
214
6
6
1
1
122
38
Other
Total Appointments
Senate Pres. Pro Tem
Speaker of House
Chairman of House Ways & Means Cmte.
Chairman of Senate Finance Cmte.
Other General Assembly Members
Governor
Taxation Realignment Commission
11
1
2
2
1
0
2
Judicial Merit Selection Commission
10
2
5
0
0
0
0
Patriots Point Development Authority
6
1
1
0
0
0
3
War Between the States Heritage Trust Commission
9
3
3
0
0
0
3
The Hunley Commission
9
3
3
0
0
0
3
Joint Committee on Municipal Incorporation
7
3
3
0
0
0
1
TOTAL
52
13
17
2
1
0
12
Legislative Power in South Carolina
Nothing in the foregoing should be construed as an attempt to aid or hinder passage of any legislation.
[2]This calculation is based on analysis of appointment powers made to 165 boards and commissions, as identified in the 2010 Legislative Manual and crosschecked against state statutes. The governor’s office, however, reports that there are more than 250 statewide boards and commissions. We have excluded agencies and departments from our count—such as the Department of Insurance and the S.C. Law Enforcement Division. We have also excluded Budget & Control Board divisions, such as Office of Human Resources and Information Technology; although the BCB itself is included in the final count.
[4]The fines/fees, or Other Funds, portion of the budget alone runs about $7 billion each year. These fines/fees do not directly correlate with the cost of the state’s regulatory burden, but give a sense of the fiscal impact of such regulations. At the federal level, the regulatory burden is estimated at 40 percent to 50 percent of total government spending (see “Ten Thousand Commandments: 2009,” Competitive Enterprise Institute). A 2005 study by the Small Business Administration found that the cost of federal regulatory burdens are much higher for small businesses: $7,647 per employee, compared to $5,282 per employee for firms with 500 employees or more.
Research and Publications
